

O P E N I N G   S T A T E M E N T

TOJO, Hideki

Individual Defense

Dr. Ichiro Kiyose  
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COUNSEL

MR. PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL:

In this opening statement we shall outline briefly the representations of the defendant TOJO, as will be testified to by him in his own deposition.

The evidence covered is divided into two parts, differing in nature, one part comprising matters of a general nature which will be amplified and more satisfactorily described by the witness from his own observations as the person most directly concerned. The second portion of the affidavit will consist of internal and external situations in Japan which led up to certain critical decisions and actions as the witness understood them at the happening, as well as of the expositions of motives, objectives and the essence thereof, although these decisions and actions of themselves have already been offered in formal proof in the General Division in this case.

TOJO's deposition begins with July, 1940, when he was recommended as War Minister in the Second KONOUE Cabinet. Before that time, TOJO had been successively appointed Commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade, at Kurume, Commander of the Kwantung District Military Police, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Vice Minister of War, and Inspector-General of the Air Force. But he held these posts merely in a capacity as an Army officer, serving faithfully under established military authority, and he was not responsible

during those years for the formulation or decision of Japanese national policies. Nor is there proof that TOJO had taken part in political activity as one of the so-called "younger officers" outside his regular duties. Therefore, with regard to the affairs which took place prior to his appointment as War Minister, he has not much to state or refute in particular. As he once stated to the Prosecution, TOJO will never evade his political and administrative responsibility for the actions he performed and the events which took place within the scope of his authority since assuming the post of War Minister in July 1940, and, later, that of Prime Minister in October 1941. As to whether he was criminally responsible therefore, we must leave to the judgment of this Honorable Tribunal.

TOJC's testimony will be given for the sake of convenience, in the order in which the events took place. So the facts which tend to serve for the same purpose of proof may appear separately from one another in accordance with the time of their occurrence. There will also be some instances where several aspects of the evidence jointly constitute a single fact, which are unavoidable in so comprehensive a presentation of events. And though it is divergent and complicated, the important matters may be summarized into the following seven points:

- (1) That Japan had neither planned nor prepared beforehand for the war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands.

The Second KONOYE Cabinet, formed in July 1940, decided upon the two national policies as set forth in "Outline of the Basic National Policy" (Ex. 541-1297) and "Gist of Main Points in Regard to Dealing with the Situation to meet the change in World Conditions" (Ex. 1310). It is a fact that these constituted the foundation policies of the Second KONOYE Cabinet and the succeeding ones. They aimed principally at (1) settling the China Affair which had already broken out, and (2) ensuring the independence and security of the state by strengthening national defence in view of the world situation at that time. The settlement of the China Affair consisted in bringing the issues to an end in such a way as to save the face of both Japan and China, to cease the anti-Japanese movement, to secure friendly relations between the two countries for the future, and to protect both nations against subversive activities of the Comintern, thereby contributing to the maintenance of peace in East Asia. It intended the realization neither of territorial ambition nor the idea of economic monopoly. The Tripartite Alliance was also concluded in order to settle the China Affair and avoid war between Japan and the United States. The actual circumstances relating to these matters at that time will be clarified by TOJO's testimony. There was no plan to dominate the world or any part thereof in conspiracy with Germany and Italy, Italy, or with any other nation or person, and his evidence should completely dispel any idea that Japan attempted or carried out such a bizarre affair.

It will be shown that both the Japanese Government and the military circles set their hopes on the success of the Japanese-American negotiations essayed in April 1941, with high hopes of bringing them to a rich fruition. Proof will also be introduced evidencing the clear intent of the Japanese Government in going to the limits of changing its Minister of Foreign Affairs to make certain of honesty of purpose in United States-Japanese negotiations. Proof will be offered that the Japanese Army formulated no actual preparations for war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands prior to 6 September 1941. Proof will further be indicated that the war, when it became unavoidable, was neither deliberate nor premeditated. The dispatch of Japanese forces to French Indo-China in 1940 and 1941 was aimed principally at the settlement of the China Affair and was carried out under the guarantee of recognizing the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and respecting the sovereignty of France therein. In this connection we have secured and so are able to produce the letter addressed by Prime Minister KONOYE to Field-Marshall Henri Phillippe Petain, the then recognized Head of the Republic of France, in July 1941. Further, Japan's policy towards the Southern regions was limited to French Indo-China and Thailand. With regard to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, it aimed merely at the maintenance of economic and commercial relations.

(2) That hostilities against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands were provoked by the allied nations, and the attacks were

unavoidably instituted by Japan in self-defense and for self-existence.

It was really a matter of the utmost seriousness that Japan, while involved in the China Affair with its four years of exhaustive national effort, should finally decide in 1941 to take up arms against the United States and Great Britain, the two greatest Powers in the World. How did such a momentous decision reach maturity? TOJO is able to tell the story. On 26 July 1941, the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands issued orders to freeze Japanese assets. The plan to improve the situation by means of a personal talk with President Roosevelt, which Premier KONOYE proposed in August, failed of effect. Thereupon, the decision to go to war was finally made through the following stages:

(a) The Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941.

(b) The Imperial Conference of 5 November 1941.

(c) The Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941.

Of the matters decided upon at the Imperial Conference of 5 November 1941, only Plans A and B, which form but a part of all the matters decided on, have been proved, and the decision itself has not yet been sufficiently shown as a whole (although this is partly touched upon in the testimony of Mr. YAMAMOTO, Kumaichi, court record 25,949)

It will be proved completely by TOJO's testimony.

At the same time the defendant will, as far as

he remembers, testify to the internal and external situation at the time when decisions were made at the above three Imperial Conferences, the information obtained as to the attitude of the United States and Great Britain, procedures that had been taken in advance before the opening of the Conferences, the details of explanations and discussions at these Conferences; and the essential point of the decisions. Of all the items enumerated above, the information obtained as to the attitude of the United States and Great Britain is of the utmost importance. For it will show that the exercise of the right of self-defence was regretable but an unavoidable course of action which the then leaders of Japan were driven to take. After November the Supreme Command of Japan was considering that a forestalling attack might perchance be made by the Americans at any time.

(3) That the Japanese Government had scrupulously prepared to deliver the lawful notification of war to the United States of America prior to the commencement of hostilities.

In TOJO's evidence it will be proved that the to gist of the note/be dispatched by Japan and the main reasons to be set forth therein were brought up for discussion by TOGO, Foreign Minister, and met with unanimous approval at the Liaison Conference on the 4th of December 1941; the procedure of its delivery were left entirely to the Foreign Minister; that Japan would be free to take any action subsequent to the delivery to the United States Government of this note with regular formalities required

for notification of war in compliance with international law; that the delivery should by all means be made to the United States Government prior to making an initial attack; and that the time of delivery of the note to the United States Government should be fixed after mutual consultation among the Foreign Minister and the Chiefs of General Staffs of the Army and the Navy. It will also be proved that at the Cabinet meeting on the following day; that is, the 5th of December, Foreign Minister TOGO gave explanations of the gist of the note to be dispatched to the United States, which was unanimously approved, and that the formalities to be taken for its delivery were left entirely to the Foreign Minister. It will also be shown how circumspect the Japanese Government was to instruct its Ambassador in Washington in order that this important note be delivered without fail at the appointed time. Namely, it will be conclusively shown that the Japanese Government had never deliberately planned to deliver the note after the Pearl Harbor Attack. That is to say, with regard to the text and delivery of the Japanese final note, both the Liaison Conference and the Cabinet positively believed that these matters had been thoroughly studied and lawfully executed by the Foreign Office authorities in the light of international law and treaties.

(4) The true purport and significance of the Greater East Asia Policy.

The Greater East Asia Policy advocated by Japan was known by various names, such as the New Order

in East Asia or the establishment of a Co-Prosperity Sphere, etc. This term was often distorted and even made an object of vilification by other nations during the war. The Japanese people, however, had always clearly understood the true purport and meaning of the term. The essence of this policy consisted in securing political freedom for all the peoples of Greater East Asia, in accordance with their voluntary desire; in other words, first the emancipation of East Asia and then mutual co-operation for the establishment of East Asia. The realization of the policy was primarily to be effected by peaceful means by appealing for international co-operation and understanding of the various nations of the world. The Pacific War, as stated above, was started for the sake of the self-existence and self-defense of Japan and not as a means to implement the Greater East Asia Policy. However, once the war was started it was inevitable that a great change should take place in the status quo of Greater East Asia. We simply took this opportunity to cooperate with the various peoples in achieving their long cherished desire. In TOJO's statement, the substance of the above-mentioned Greater East Asiatic Policy, and the measures adopted as a means for its realization will be shown. Above all, it will be explained how:

- (a) the last remnants of unequal treaties, then existent, between Japan and China, were abolished
- (b) recognition of the independence of self-government of all East Asiatic peoples.

(c) the Greater East Asiatic Conference was held to promote mutual understanding between the various nations.

These are items connected with and tend to prove that Japan did not entertain any aggressive intention in this connection.

(5) The Non-existence of the So-called "Militaristic Clique."

The Indictment opens with the statement: "In the years hereinafter referred to in this Indictment, the internal and foreign policies of Japan were dominated and directed by a 'criminal militaristic clique'". Such an allegation, which seems to be woven through the entire Indictment, is a fallacy of the highest degree, one having no basis in fact or foundation whatever. At that time, if it is true, voices of the War Ministry, the Army General Staff, the Navy Ministry, the Navy General Staff, component parts of the state organization carried great weight. This, however, is attributable to the fact that these military organs had come to be entrusted with greater power as a result of the system of selecting Army and Navy Ministers from the active list, as well as the absolute independence of High Command from civil administration. Then too, the political parties became alienated from the people owing to international unrest and internal discontent. It does not mean, however, that there existed any organization having powerful influence which could be termed a "militaristic

"clique" in fact or in imagination, outside the officially constituted state organization, nor that any such influential clique come to power with the specific object of carrying out policies of their own. Throughout TOJO's testimony, it cannot be admitted for a moment that any such imaginary power ever was a motivating force behind the internal and foreign policies of Japan. It is indeed true that there existed a movement by the so-called "younger" element and such incidents as May 15th and February 26th occurred. However, on these respective occasions, the actual leaders of the Army and Navy spared no efforts to suppress them. After the outbreak of these affairs, there were not a few who attempted to achieve their own ambition, taking advantage of these incidents to propagandize that these incidents were representative of the general atmosphere of the Army and the Navy.

It happened that these groundless rumors gave rise to a gradual growth of feeling of the existence of some militaristic clique of a tyrannical nature. We must point out that those who were moved by such rumors did not take pains to ascertain the actual situation from anyone with responsibility, and rashly concluded out of sheer imagination that there was such a group as to be called a "militaristic clique." Since the February 26th Incident, in particular, the successive War Ministers had strictly prohibited military personnel from taking part in political affairs, and had been exceedingly vigorous in straightening out and maintaining military discipline. It was widely known that during TOJO's

tenure of office as War Minister, there was nothing left to be desired in regard to the control over Army and civilian personnel, as well as the maintenance of military discipline. This will all be shown in his testimony.

(6) The Independence of the Supreme Command and the functions of the Liaison and the Imperial Conferences.

Under the former Constitution, national defense and military operations; that is, matters pertaining to the Supreme Command were not included in the state affairs, as repeatedly alluded to in this trial. Thus, it was generally understood that state administrative ministers (including War and Navy Ministers) were not authorized to interfere in affairs strictly the province of the Supreme Command. In actuality, however, if the state structure was divided into two separate parts, the civil administration and the Supreme Command, having nothing to do with each other, there would be no diplomatic and military functions at work. So in order to bring about adjustment and harmonization between the two divisions, the Liaison Conference, the Imperial Conference, and, later, the Supreme War Directing Council were created. It will be explained that matters decided by these organs were further to be ratified, according to the nature of the proceedings, by organs provided for in the Constitution, such as the Cabinet or the Supreme Command, and thus made constitutionally valid, specifying the source of responsibility for the matter involved.

The testimony of this witness will be helpful in locating the source of responsibility for various decisions connected with the questions here discussed.

(7) That the dominant characteristics of the Military Administration exercised by TOJ consisted in a just control and discipline of the military system, and he gave neither orders for, tolerated, nor connived at any inhuman acts.

During the periods in which he held various positions in the Army, TOJO was well known for his stressing of just control and stern discipline. On the occasion of the February 26th Incident in 1936, he promptly arrested in Manchuria many of those involved, and established rigid control to avoid any further disturbances there. When he was for the first time entrusted with political responsibility as War Minister in the Second KONOYE Cabinet, it was one of his principles, in regard to the Army, to "further intensify the control of the Army."

Accordingly, in September 1940, when the advance was made into Northern French Indo-China, he ordered a Court-Martial to determine whether the border was illegally crossed or not. He also requested a court-martial when it was alleged there was maltreatment regarding prisoners of war in connection with the construction of the Burma-Siam railroad. The efficient use of regularity and the observance of laws and regulations were the features of military administration under TOJO. Careful consideration was paid to the proper treatment of prisoners of war. In regard to the treatment of civilian

internees, he never disregarded or connived at violations of laws and regulations. Neither the text of "Prisoners of War's Labor Regulations" issued in his name, nor the instructions given to the Commanders of the prisoner of war camps ordered forced labor to be imposed. TOJO issued especially "Instructions to the Officers and Men at the Front" by which he ordered all officers and men to carry out and strictly observe the instructions therein. He never at any time gave orders for, or countenanced the commission of an inhuman and it is a fact, as referred to by other defendants, that he had always been strictly obedient to the desires of the Emperor. It will also be proved that he laid before the Throne the matter of obtaining the Imperial sanction for commutation of death sentences imposed upon enemy fliers who raided Tokyo. This act of his is believed to be in accordance with the Emperor's gracious desires.

At this stage of the TOJO case, no other witness will be called other than TOJO himself, who will take the stand to give his own testimony. We are to submit several documents, nearly all of which are either those cited in the TOJO affidavit or those certifying to non-availability of the original texts of the documents referred to in TOJO's statement, in compliance with the regulations of this Tribunal.

Def. Doc. 2807

ERRATA SHEET

Insert at the end of paragraph 1, page 4.

"It will also be testified that Japan never intended or planned aggression against U.S.S.R., although she had always been intent to prevent bolshevization of East Asia by the subversive activities of the Comintern."

東條英機部門書類陳述

裁判長並に裁判官各位

De 2. Do 002807

本書類陳述に於ては東條被告か供述せんとする所の全被告人の事件を  
簡潔に表あせんとするものであります。  
右に依り立證せんとする事柄は性質上二つに挙れます。その一つは、  
一概的性質を有する事項であつて而も未だ立證せられざりしものを、  
東條が該事項の証據者として自己の見聞に依り立證資料を追加せんと  
するものであります。その二は、既に外形的には一應立證せられた所  
の公の決定又は實施せられた措置につき、此の國家重大の時機に際會  
してその乙を決するに至つた所の国内外の情勢、之を寫すに至つた  
動機、目的、此の決定及措置の意図を解示する事であります。  
東條の供述は一九四〇年七月に全人が第二次近衛内閣の陸軍大臣に  
准ぜられた時に始まります。それより以前東條は古く久留米に  
て薦ける歩兵第二十四旅団長となり、陸軍次官、航空總監等に任命せられました。されば久留米  
これ等は總て陸軍々人として、その軍の規律の下に服務したものではある  
ありません。又、東條は當に所謂「青年將校」としてその本筋以外に  
於て政治的行動を爲した事実もありませんから、陸相就任以前の事柄

につき進んで供述すべき多くのものを有つて居らぬのであります。東様が一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月陸相就任以来、わけても、一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月總理大臣彈劾以來、その職務内に於て爲した事や、發生した事件に付いては、嘗て檢察官にも告げた如く、政治的行政的の責任を問はずるものではありません。たゞその事の消法上の責任の有無については貴調査所の御判断に待つものであります。

東様の證言は價値上、やはり事件發生の年代順に陳述して居ります。それ故、同一立證目的を達する事例（複数）でも、その發生の機會内に於て前後掛け離れて出現します。又、該証の立證目的が一の事實内に結合して存在する場合も多いのであります。これは本件の如き辰巳なる事實を取扱ふに付き避けがたき所であります。而してそれは相手に直ります。そのため、その重要な事項は次の七點に要約する事が出来ます。

第一、日本は蘇る、米、英、朝に對する政策を計劃し準備したものでない事。

一九四〇年七月第二次近衛内閣が成立し、「基本政策要綱」（證三四一、一二九七一と「世界情勢の推移に伴ふ時局處置要綱」（證一三一〇）の二つの國家が決定しました。そしてこれが、その後同内閣及その以後の内閣の政策の基準を爲した事は事實であります。右は（一）當

時既に發生して居つた支那事變を解決する事と(二)當時の世界の情勢に  
盡み十分なる国防を整備し國家の獨立と安全とを確保することが主眼  
でありました。支那事變の解決といふのは中國と日本との双方の面目  
を立て、毎日毎日を停止し、兩國將來の友好を保持し、コマンテルン  
の侵入を防止し、以て東亞の平和を維持するような形態でこの事件を  
終結する事であります。領土的野心、經濟的霸占の惡意は含まれて居  
りません。三國同盟も亦支那事變を解決し日米蘭の競争を遠くするため  
に居たる所を離せられませう。

而して、伊と又は真摯の誠又は個人と共謀して世界を制覇する計画もなく  
の事実、之を實行した事もありません。東洋の前途は斯る異常なる計画  
の存在又は實施に請する機会を一掃するであります。一九四一年四月に始ま  
るの成績に多大の望をかけ何とかその成立を見るよう努力した事が證  
明せらるります。日本はこれが爲めて外務大臣の取扱まで行つた事の證  
明手に對しては何等の實際的準備もして居なかつた事が證明せら  
れます。眞摯が不可避となつたときにもそれが謀に甚くもので  
れます。

も、又計劃的のものでもなかつた事が證明せられるであります。一九四〇年及び四一年に於ける佛印派兵も亦支那事變解決が主目的で、佛印に対する領土の保全、主義の尊重の確約の下に行はれたのであります。この保證に關しては一九四一年七月近衛首相が當時の佛蘭西共和国元首として公認せられたるアンリー・フキツブ、ベタン元帥に宛てた書面を發見しましたから之を引用する事が出來ます。且つ此等我國の南方政策も佛印及泰撫復度とし、馬來、新印等に對しては經濟關係通商關係の維持を目的としたのでありました。

三

而して石のうち米天の態度につき我方の受けたる情報は最も重りであ  
ります。之に依り當時日本の指導者に取られて國家の自衛権の動かされしむべ  
と然し乍ら已むを待ざることでつゝ理由が證明せられるであります。  
十一月以後に於ては我軍即ち木村にて先制攻撃の毎に出づるやも仰ら  
ずと考へたのであります。  
是日本政府は合法的の通告を以て手順を盡へたるものなる事  
周到なる在志を以て手順を盡へたるものなる事  
東條の供述に於ては一九四一年十二月四日の通報を前に於て東條外相より  
我軍より申すべき通告反対理由の説明の爲め、真交何  
の手續は外相大臣に一任したが、石通告は國際法に依る競争の通告として  
交渉は必ず攻撃前に行方不明の爲め、石通告は國際法に對する交渉の爲め、  
と兩種ととの間に實施する事、通告の本體政府に對する交渉の時國威外相  
します。又翌十二月五日の開戦の上之と次走する事を定めたことが證明せらる  
し全員又を了承し其の手續は外相にて日本海外相より對木通告の骨子を説明  
します。即ち日本側が後に交付するよう圖つたのでないが、  
遂終的に道明せらるるであります。乃ち右通告の内容及取扱につけては連絡會談及内相ともに外相當局に於  
て實際反國際條約に顧みぬものとして全く之に信頼して居りました。

第四 大東亞政局の眞意義

## 第五

起訴状はその傍題に於て本件に於て言及せる期間に於て、日本の對内對外政策は「犯罪的軍閥」に依り支配せられ且指導せられたと言つて居ります。この見解は本件起訴状の全体に影響を及ぼして居りますが、この主張は全く事實に基盤を置かぬところの一の空想であります。此の時代に於て、國家の組織の一部たる陸軍省、參謀本部、海軍省海軍軍令部の發言權が重きを盡したといふ事實は存在します。これはしからず、一方に於ては陸海軍武官制とか、統帥權の獨立とかいふ國家の制度の結果、此等の機關が重大な權力を持つて居つたといふ事、又他方の離反等からであつて、之が勢力を有したといふ事ではあります。又かく、この團体がもつて、之が勢力を有したといふ事ではあります。又かく、この勢力が自家の主張を實行する目的を以て殊更に政權を掌握したといふ事であります。東條の證言の始より終までを通じ斯の如き無形の勢力が國家の内政、外政を動かした事を認むる事は出來ませぬ。又かく、所謂青年將校の運動があり、又、五、一五事件、二、二六事件の如きが軍内一般の空氣なるかの如く故意に宣傳して自己の野望を遂げんとする事が起つた事實はあります。其の度毎に軍の正式首腦は之を抑壓

## 第

したもののが少くありません。斯の如き無根の風説が軍閥の存在及其の横暴の感を生じたことがあります。斯る風説に動かされた者は責任者のと云ふべきであります。特に二・二六事件以來歷代の陸軍大臣は軍人の政治干與を最禁して軍紀の肅正確立に邁進しました。東條が陸軍大臣時代に至つては軍人軍屬の統督、軍紀の確立には最早間障が無かつたことは定説のあつた所であります。これ等の經緯も本證言に依り證明せられさせう。

第六、統帥權の獨立と連絡會議及御前會議の運用  
舊憲法の下に於ては國防用兵、即ち統帥の事は憲法上の國務の内に包含せられぬものとせられて居りました。従つて國務大臣、陸海軍大臣もそのうちに含む一は統帥に干渉する權限がないものとせられて居りました。一國の方針が一般行政と統帥の二つに分離しては、外交、軍事の實行の仕方がない。そこで兩者の協調を圖るために連絡會議、御前會議、最高戰爭指導會議まるものが發生しました。それ等の決定事項は更に其の性質に従ひ憲法の規定に依る機關即ち内閣又は統帥部に於て確認し、茲に憲法上の責任を生ずることか説明せられます。この事に關する被告の供述は本件に關係ある各種の決定の責任の所在を定めに役立つてあります。

第七、東條の行いたる軍政の特徴は統制と紀律に在りたる事

並に彼は未だ曾て非人道行爲を命令、許容、承認したことなきこと  
 東條は陸軍部内の各種の地位に在つた時に於て本を正なる統制と嚴格  
 なる規律を重んずる事に依り有名であると矣。一九三六年の二、二  
 六事件の際に於ても滿洲に於て直ちにその關係者が監督を取らし事を得  
 せしめました。第二次近衛内閣の隨相として始めて政治的責任を帶ふ  
 るに至つた時に於ても、一軍の統制を一層確實にする事に以て陸軍  
 の今後の軍事方針の一としました。仍て一九四〇年九月新編陸軍法  
 の時にも敵機の有無については軍法會議の開催をすゝめし。本艦鑑  
 道の建設につき終戦處遇に詮達ありとした場合に於ける軍法會議を求  
 めて居ります。組織の利用、法規の遵守が東條の行いたる軍政の特徴  
 の建説につき終戦處遇に詮達ありとした場合に於ける軍政の特徴  
 の時に於ても留意せられました。一般人の處遇  
 に於ても常に法規を犯すことを許し又は之を承認した事とてはありま  
 せぬ。貴様の名に於て邊モられた俘虜收容所長に與へ  
 てあります。在る者のため特に戰禦訓を制定し、將士に對しその遵守を命じま  
 す。苟も非人道行爲を命令し、或は承認したことはありませぬ。東條は前線  
 は、常に天皇陛下の御恩召を厳格に守らんと努力した事は他の被  
 告も言及した通りであります。東京空襲の飛行士に對しても、陛下平

業の御意思を體しその**死刑**を奏請した事も立證せられます。  
東條辯護の部門に於ては、東條自身が證人として供述を爲すの外  
は、證人の訊問はありません。吾々は尙ほ數通の書證を提出しますが  
これは總て東條が其の供述中に言及した文書を、當裁判所の規定に従  
つて引用するか、若くはその原本の不存在の證明であります。

正誤表

四頁の終に左の一文を挿入して下さい  
「東條の語言に於ては日本はコミニンテルンの不法活動に因る東亞の  
赤化に對しては終始その防衛に力を盡しましたが、ソビエット社會の  
主義聯邦に對する侵略は曾て意圖し計劃した事もなき事が證せられ  
てあります」